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Abstract. 
 
Regret is often symptomatic of the defective decisions associated with “temporary 
preference” problems. It may also help overcome these defects. Outcome regret can 
modify the relative utilities of different payoffs. Process regret can motivate search for 
better decision processes or trap-evading strategies. Heightened regret may thus be 
functional for control of these self-defeating choices. 
 
_________________ 
 
In Ainslie’s taxonomy of “temporary preference” problems the defining feature of 
addictions is that “… the imminent prospect of such activities is strongly rewarding, but 
they’re avoided if foreseen from a distance and regretted afterward” (p.49; italics added). 
In compulsions, similarly, “regret may still occur … and the person may even expect the 
regret while indulging in the behavior” (p.50), but the behavior still persists. Regret, then, 
may accompany, or even define, the problematic behaviors. What Ainslie appears to 
overlook is the possibility that regret may help to control them. 
 
The “temporary preference” problem involves, minimally, the integration of two payoffs, 
one of which arrives earlier than the other, and is thus prone to the immediacy or 
hyperbolic discount effect. Viewed from a suitable distance before or after the choice the 
later option is superior. Close to the decision point the earlier option is (temporarily) 
more attractive, a phenomenon that, as Ainslie notes (p.198), “… can’t be changed by 
insight per se”. The addict surrenders to the overwhelming desire for a fix, and the 
compulsive for yet another hand-wash, despite a clear intellectual understanding that she 
would, on balance, prefer not to and that the temporary urge will pass. Intellection is 
overpowered by emotion, System 2 by System 1 (Kahneman, 2003). 
 
Although emotions commonly involve both cognition and feeling (Frijda 1988), regret 
does so to an unusually large extent (Landman 1993). Asked if we feel regret over our 
choice of job, spouse, or vacation, most of us would reply “Let me think”. We comfort a 
friend torn by feelings of regret by offering consoling thoughts: “How could you have 
known?” “You made a careful choice, there’s nothing to blame yourself for”. This 
intimate interweaving of thought and feeling has made regret the variable of choice for 
decision theorists interested in emotions. Perhaps it has a role to play in the complete 
understanding of temporary preference problems. 
 
It is useful to distinguish two targets of decision-related regret: (1) regret associated with 
the outcome of a decision, and (2) regret associated with the choice process itself 
(Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). The former seems to be essentially a reference-point 
phenomenon, in which the value of an outcome is reduced (or, if positive, enhanced: 
rejoicing) by comparison with some reference point, commonly the outcome of a 
foregone alternative (see Mellers, Schwartz & Ritov, 1999; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; 
Bell, 1982). The second seems to involve a stronger component of self-blame or remorse, 
and is tied to the feeling that the decision made or the process used in making it was, in 
retrospect, insufficiently justified. The two regrets may be compounded, as for a mother 
who feels both outcome regret at the sickness of her small child, and self-blame regret at 
not having thought more carefully about his medical care (Reb & Connolly, 2005) The 
failed dieter regrets both the additional weight gained and the poor decision about the 
chocolate cake. 
 
There is abundant evidence that anticipated regret can influence decisions in a variety of 
domains, including medical care (Connolly & Reb, 2002), consumer decisions 
(Simonson, 1992) and negotiations (Larrick & Boles, 1995). Richard, van der Pligt and 
de Vries (1996) report some success in one temporary preference context, curbing unsafe 
sexual behavior, by shifting time-frames and making regret salient. They asked their 
respondents about either their feelings about unsafe sex or the feelings they would 
anticipate after having had unsafe sex. Participants in the second condition reported 
“safer” behavioral expectations immediately, and less actual risky sexual behavior in the 
six months following the experiment.  How, exactly, might such a manipulation of regret 
salience achieve this promising result? 
 
Two mechanisms might be suggested, paralleling the two sorts of regret described above. 
One possibility is that the manipulation enhanced outcome regret associated with the 
smaller, sooner behavior (unsafe sex), lowering its payoff value, and/or increased the 
larger, later payoff value by adding a component of rejoicing. It is clear from the 
conventional portrayal of discounted payoff values (e.g. Ainslie, Figure 4, p.63) that 
modestly lowering the earlier payoff or raising the later one could resolve the preference 
reversal in favor of the later behavior. 
 
A second, perhaps complementary, mechanism might rely on the self-blame, process-
oriented component of regret. We have shown in recent work (Reb, 2005) that making 
regret salient to experimental participants can lead them to use more careful decision 
processes, acquire more decision-relevant information and deliberate longer before 
deciding. Perhaps the participants in Richard et al’s study responded to the regret-
salience manipulation by searching more diligently for alternative choices, weighing the 
costs and benefits of the unsafe behavior more carefully, or considering one of the 
familiar self-control strategies discussed by Ainslie (p.73ff). 
 
The hypothesis, then, is that regret can be more than a mere symptom of failed decision 
making.  Regret may, in some circumstances, play a role in improving decisions: the 
experience of regret can drive learning in repeated decisions; its anticipation can shape 
single decisions. Outcome regret affects decisions by modifying the relative 
attractiveness of different payoffs. Process-related regret does so by motivating the search 
for trap-evading strategies such as decision bundling, precommitment, and the like. In 
both cases the interweaving of thought and feeling that characterize regret provide the 
bridge between System 1 and System 2 processes, between the thoughtful appraisal of the 
distant goal and the visceral appeal of the immediate indulgence. Without venturing into 
evolutionary speculation that regret may have developed to serve such a system-bridging 
purpose, it is not difficult to see that some level of regret can be highly functional for 
control of the self-defeating processes that temporary preference problems represent. The 
hypothesis seems to us worthy of serious consideration. 
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